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TOO MUCH PROTECTION AND, AT THE SAME TIME,
NOT ENOUGH: INCONSISTENT TREATMENT OF
ADOLESCENTS BY THE SUPREME COURT
INTRODUCTION
Adolescence is a difficult time, not only for the teens themselves,
but also for parents, schools, and society. It is a period in life when an
individual walks the line between childhood and maturity. Even the
United States Supreme Court has been unable to set clear guidelines
regarding teens and their place in society. The Supreme Court has
decided several cases that impact adolescents but those decisions also
send conflicting messages to all involved. Teens, especially those in
high school, are viewed as children who need protection, even if that
means taking away or minimizing their constitutional rights. How-
ever, at the same time, teens are often expected to act like adults and,
like adults, are held responsible for their actions. This is especially
true if a teen's actions offend a normative standard, for example,
when a teen commits a crime. Are adolescents children who need
protection or young adults who need to take responsibility?
This Comment will analyze several recent Supreme Court decisions
in the context of earlier decisions and will suggest that the Court is
inconsistent in its treatment of adolescents. The current Court' ap-
pears to suggest that teens must take responsibility for their actions as
though they are already adults. However, this Court also suggests that
teens are forced to accept that they are not entitled to all the constitu-
tional protections to which adults are entitled. Teens are subjected to
a lower standard of constitutional protection because adults want-
and are determined-to protect them. At the same time, however,
teens have not been protected. Adolescents can be sentenced to the
death penalty but, at the same time, do not receive the standard con-
stitutional level of protection from illegal search and seizure when
they are at school. 2 The Court is sending a mixed message to our
adolescents. Teens are taught that they are not as important to society
1. The current Court comprises Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Stephen Breyer,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, David
Souter, John Paul Stevens, and Clarence Thomas.
2. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist.,
524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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as adults because their constitutional rights are not protected to the
same extent adults' rights are protected. This message to teens can
only serve to increase the problems that adolescents face today.
Part II of this Comment will offer a background for the develop-
ment of the rights of children and teens. First, subpart A will focus on
major cases that marked the earliest decisions in which the Court ad-
dressed the issue of children's rights during the 1920s.3 Next, subpart
B will address the major cases that began to confer rights upon chil-
dren and teens during the 1960s and early 1970s.4 This Comment dis-
cusses these rights within the criminal context, 5 within the school
context,6 and finally, the context of abortion. 7 Third, Part II will
demonstrate the decline in the rights of children and teens that took
place largely during the 1980s, in the context of criminal, school, and
abortion cases. 8 Finally, more recent cases affecting teens will be dis-
cussed.9 Part III will expand on these cases, focusing on the negative
and conflicting messages the current Court sends to teens. 10 These
inconsistencies are shown through an analysis of decisions concerning
sexual harassment and drug testing in schools as well as those uphold-
ing capital punishment for adolescent offenders.11 Part IV will outline
the negative impact these decisions will continue to have on our na-
tion's adolescents.12
II. BACKGROUND: THE DEVELOPMENT AND DECLINE OF
ADOLESCENTS' RIGHTS
The Supreme Court began to decide cases involving the rights of
children and teens in the 1920s. It was not until the 1960s that the
Court first recognized that children and teens were entitled to some of
the constitutional rights enjoyed by adults. Historically, the Court has
struggled to define adequately those rights. In the 1970s and 1980s,
the conservative-minded Court formulated decisions that proved to
narrow and limit those rights.
3. See infra notes 13-22 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 23-61 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 23-35 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 36-46 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 47-61 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 62-100 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 101-124 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 125-244 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 125-244 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 245-270 and accompanying text.
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A. Early Decisions Concerning Children and Teens: 1920s
Historically, children were not given constitutional rights or protec-
tions; parents were given the constitutional right to guide their chil-
dren's development. Two cases were instrumental in developing this
right of parents to control their children. 13 The first, Meyer v.
Nebraska,14 held that a state statute that prohibited the teaching of
foreign languages to students before the ninth grade was unconstitu-
tional. 15 The State of Nebraska had created this statute "to foster a
homogeneous people with American ideals. ' 16 The Court held that
the Nebraska Legislature had "attempted materially to interfere with
• . . the power of parents to control the education of their own
[children]. 17
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 8 the Court held that a state statute
was unconstitutional because it required parents to send their children
to public rather than to private schools. 19 The State of Oregon had
created the Compulsory Education Act,20 which required parents to
send their children to public schools when the children were between
the ages of eight and sixteen. 21 The Court held that that the Act "un-
13. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
14. 262 U.S. 390.
15. Id. at 399-400. Justice James McReynolds wrote for the majority, while Justice Oliver
Wendell Homes wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justice George Sutherland.
16. Id. at 402. See also Bartels v. Iowa 262 U.S. 404, 412 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice
Holmes found it "desirable that all the citizens of the United States should speak a common
tongue," and therefore did not find it unreasonable to allow states to forbid the teaching of
foreign languages. Id.
17. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401.
18. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
19. Id. at 534-35. Justice McReynolds again wrote for the majority.
20. 1922 Or. Laws 5259, cited in Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530-31. At the time the case was decided,
the Compulsory Education Act read:
Sec. 5259. Children Between the Ages of Eight and Sixteen Years. - Any parent, guard-
ian or other person in the state of Oregon, having control or charge or custody of a
child under the age of sixteen years and of the age of eight years or over at the com-
mencement of a term of public school of the district in which said child resides, who
shall fail or neglect or refuse to send such child to a public school for the period of time
a public school shall be held during the current year in said district, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor and each day's failure to send such child to a public school shall consti-
tute a separate offense; provided, that in the following cases, children shall not be re-
quired to attend public schools ....
Id. The statute lists several exceptions to the public school requirement: If the child is physically
unable to attend school, if the child has completed the eighth grade, if the child lives too far from
any public school, or if the child is being schooled at home by a parent or private teacher, then
the child is not required to attend public school. The statute also lists fine and imprisonment as
punishment for conviction of this crime. 1922 Or. Laws 5259.
21. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530. Interestingly, under the statute, parents were permitted to teach
their children at home themselves or with a private teacher, provided they received permission
from the superintendent, but it seems parents were not permitted to allow a private teacher to
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reasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control. 22
These cases began the trend toward parental sovereignty, apart from
the state, to have complete control over how children were raised and
educated.
B. Development of Children's Rights: 1960s and Early 1970s
During the 1960s, the Court began to develop the rights of adoles-
cents separate and distinct from their parents' rights to control them.
This section will discuss the cases involving these rights in the contexts
of criminal law, schools, and abortion.
1. Criminal Cases Involving the Rights of Minors
In a 1967 Arizona case, In re Gault,23 the Court established the
principle that children are entitled to some constitutional protec-
tions.2 4 In Gault, a minor was arrested for making obscene phone
calls.25 The police detained and questioned the minor without giving
notice to his parents. 26 At the trial, there was no sworn testimony,
and no transcript was taken.27 The minor was convicted and sen-
tenced to state industrial school for six years.28 The United States Su-
preme Court set aside the conviction and held that, although a
juvenile hearing need not "conform with all of the requirements of a
criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing,... [i]t must
teach their children within a group of other children, which might be like a private school. 1922
Or. Laws 5259.
22. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534.
23. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
24. Id. Justice Abe Fortas wrote for the majority, and was joined by Chief Justice Earl Warren
and Justices William J. Brennan, William Douglas, and Tom Clark. Justices Hugo Black and
Byron White wrote concurring opinions and Justice John Harlan concurred in part and dissented
in part. Justice Potter Stewart dissented.
25. Id. at 4. At the time of his arrest, the minor, Gerald Gault, was currently on probation for
six months for being with another boy who had stolen a wallet. Id. Gerald was arrested on June
8, 1964 with his friend because a neighbor complained that the boys were making obscene phone
calls to her. Id. Justice Fortas, writing for the majority, stated: "It will suffice for purposes of
this opinion to say that the remarks ... put to her were of the irritatingly offensive, adolescent,
sex variety." Id.
26. Gault, 387 U.S. at 5. Gerald was taken into custody while both of his parents were at
work. Id. at 4. His mother came home to find him gone and, after asking neighbors, was told he
had been arrested. Id.
27. Id. The complaining witness-the neighbor-was not at the hearing to testify. Id.
28. Id. at 7-8. If an adult had committed this crime, the sentence might have been a fine of
five to fifty dollars or not more than two months of incarceration. Gault, 387 U.S. at 8-9. Addi-
tionally, the State of Arizona did not permit appeals in juvenile cases. Id. at 5.
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measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment. '29
Thus, the Court established that children, not just adults, are entitled
to constitutional due process. 30
Another landmark case, In re Winship,31 established that the stan-
dard of proof for a juvenile case should be the same as the standard
for adults: proof beyond a reasonable doubt.32 The juvenile in this
case, a twelve-year-old boy, was arrested for stealing $112 out of a
locker and was sentenced to a training school for eighteen months,
which could be extended to his eighteenth birthday. 33 The New York
court found the boy guilty by a preponderance of the evidence. 34 The
29. Id at 30. Gerald was denied not only due process, but several other constitutional protec-
tions given to adults. In addition to being subjected to a warrantless arrest, Gerald and his
parents were denied the right to counsel, notice of charges, confrontation and cross-examination
of his accuser, the privilege against self-incrimination, a transcript, and the right to appeal. Id. at
10. The State of Arizona argued that juveniles benefited from an informal court proceeding, that
the judge should act as a father who "touched the heart and conscience of the erring youth by
talking over his problems, by paternal advice and admonition .... " Id. at 25-26.
30. The Court did not hold that juveniles are entitled to all of the constitutional protections
afforded adults in criminal proceedings. This holding applied only to juvenile proceedings in
which the child could be sentenced to some kind of state institution. Id. at 13. Additionally, the
Court held only that certain rights and privileges were guaranteed to juveniles, namely, the right
to notice of charges, Gault, 387 U.S. at 33; the right to counsel, id. at 41; the right to confronta-
tion unless the juvenile confessed, id. at 57; and the privilege against self-incrimination, id. at 55.
The Court did not rule on the right to a transcript or the right to appeal. Id. at 57-58. Justice
Harlan, in his opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, articulated three criteria for
courts to use to determine whether procedural due process was violated:
[F]irst, no more restrictions should be imposed than are imperative to assure the pro-
ceedings' fundamental fairness; second, the restrictions which are imposed should be
those which preserve, so far as possible, the essential elements of the State's purpose;
and finally, restrictions should be chosen which will later permit the orderly selection of
any additional protections which may ultimately prove necessary.
Id. at 72 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Harlan also seemed to be
concerned with maintaining the separate juvenile justice system. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 72. Jus-
tice Stewart, in his dissent, pointed out that juvenile proceedings are not criminal, adversary
proceedings, and therefore the protections offered by the Constitution were not necessary. Id. at
78 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart felt that juvenile proceedings were meant to help a
child correct behavior rather than to punish. Id. at 79. As he stated in his opinion:
Juvenile proceedings are not criminal trials. They are not civil trials. They are simply
not adversary proceedings. Whether treating with a delinquent child, a neglected child,
a defective child, or a dependent child, a juvenile proceedings's whole purpose and
mission is the very opposite of the mission and purpose of a prosecution in a criminal
court. The object of one is correction of a condition. The object of the other is convic-
tion and punishment for a criminal act.
Id. at 78-79.
31. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Harlan
wrote a concurring opinion; Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented. Justice
Black wrote a separate dissenting opinion.
32. Id. at 368.
33. Id. at 360.
34. Id. Preponderance of the evidence is clearly a lesser standard than proof beyond a reason-
able doubt.
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Supreme Court reversed, holding that when "a 12-year-old child is
charged with an act of stealing which renders him liable to confine-
ment for as long as six years, then, as a matter of due process ... the
case against him must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. '35 Thus,
the Court sought to expand children's constitutional rights.
2. School Cases Involving the Rights of Minors
In 1969, the Court established First Amendment protection for high
school students in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Commu-
nity School District.36 In Tinker, students wanted to protest the Viet-
nam War by wearing black armbands to school.37 School officials
suspended the students who wore the armbands until they would
come back to school without them.38 The trial court dismissed the
students' complaint and allowed the school's action because it was
needed to "prevent the disturbance of school discipline. '39
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the students' protest was
"pure speech," with no reason to believe it would invoke any sort of
disturbance, and was therefore protected by the First Amendment. 40
Students and teachers do not "shed their constitutional rights to free-
dom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. '41 The Court
went on to discuss students' rights in public schools.42 Justice Abe
Fortas, writing for the majority, stated that "[s]chool officials do not
35. Id. at 368 (citing W. v. Family Court, 247 N.E.2d 253, 260 (N.Y. 1969) (Fuld, C.J., dissent-
ing)). Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, also stated that "[tlhe same considerations that
demand extreme caution in factfinding to protect the innocent adult apply as well to the inno-
cent child." Winship, 397 U.S. at 365. As in Gault, the Court rejected the notion that to hold
states to the standard of due process by requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt would in
some way lessen the benefits of the separate juvenile system. Id. at 367. Justice Harlan, in his
concurring opinion, again (as in Gault) emphasized that holding courts to a standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt would not impair the special juvenile system and judges from the
ability to rehabilitate youth. Id. at 375 (Harlan, J., concurring). He stated that this decision
should not affect juvenile court judges adversely; rather, it "simply requires a juvenile court
judge to be more confident in his belief that the youth did the act with which he has been
charged." Id.
36. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
37. Id. at 504. The petitioners, John Tinker, fifteen years old, Christopher Eckhardt, sixteen
years old, and Mary Beth Tinker (John's sister), thirteen years old, had agreed to wear black
armbands to school during the holidays and also to fast on December 16 and New Year's Eve.
Id. The teens and their parents had previously been involved in similar peaceful protests. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 504-05.
40. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505-06.
41. Id. at 506.
42. Id. at 506-14.
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possess an absolute authority over their students. '43 Students in
school are "persons" under the Constitution who possess fundamental
rights.44 Justice Fortas went on to hold: "In the absence of a specific
showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, stu-
dents are entitled to freedom of expression of their views."' 45 This
holding would eventually be limited in 1988 by the Rehnquist Court.46
3. Abortion Cases Involving the Rights of Minor Girls
The Court first addressed the issue of pregnant teens obtaining
abortions in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth.47 In
Danforth, the Court considered a state statute requiring parental con-
sent before an unmarried girl under eighteen years of age could obtain
an abortion.48 Justice Harry A. Blackmun, writing for the Court,
stated that "[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. '49
Furthermore, Justice Blackmun affirmed that minors, not just adults,
enjoy constitutional rights. 50 The Court held the statute unconstitu-
tional because a "blanket veto" by a third party, even if that party is a
parent, is constitutionally unacceptable. 51 The Court noted, "Any in-
dependent interest the parent may have in the termination of the mi-
nor daughter's pregnancy is no more weighty than the right of privacy
43. Id. at 511. Justice Fortas's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Doug-
las, Brennan, and Marshall. Justices Stewart and White wrote separate concurring opinions,
while Justices Black and Harlan dissented.
44. Id. However, Justice Stewart, in his one paragraph concurrence, wrote to express his opin-
ion that, although he agreed with the Court's decision, he did not feel that "the First Amend-
ment rights of children are co-extensive with those of adults." Id. at 514-15 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
45. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511. Justice Harlan, however, disagreed with the Court. In his dissent,
he stated that "school officials should be accorded the widest authority in maintaining discipline
and good order in their institutions." Id. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting). He felt that as long as
the school did not have illegitimate reasons for restricting speech, such as to curtail the unpopu-
lar point of view, it should be permitted to regulate student speech. Id.
46. See infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text. See also H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398,
413 (1981).
47. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court, in which every
Justice concurred in some or all parts. Justice White filed an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, in which Justices Burger and Rehnquist joined. Justice Stevens also filed an
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
48. Id. at 74.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, stressed the impor-
tance of parental involvement in this difficult decision. Id. at 91 (Stewart, J., concurring). He
felt that a state would be acting responsibly toward these pregnant girls by encouraging them to
talk to their parents. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 91. However, he did believe that a judicial bypass
provision would be necessary. Id.
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of the competent minor."52 Thus, the Court affirmed a teen girl's
right to abortion, separate and apart from her parents' right to control
her upbringing.
The Court again considered parental consent for abortion in Bellotti
v. Baird.53 In Bellotti, the Court considered a Massachusetts statute
that required a pregnant teen to obtain consent from a parent if she
wanted an abortion.54 Justice Lewis F. Powell, writing for the Court,
rejected the statute as an unconstitutional infringement on a pregnant
girl's right to an abortion.5 5 However, the Court did allow the state to
require parental consent, but only if the state provided an alternative
procedure, such as a judicial proceeding, whereby the minor could ob-
tain authorization for an abortion without parental consent by proving
to a judge that she is mature enough to make the decision herself or
that the abortion is in her best interest, even if she cannot obtain her
parents' consent.5 6 The Court in Bellotti did not base its decision on
the reasoning that teen girls are entitled to constitutional rights, as set
forth in Danforth, but instead reasoned that the state does have a
need to control minors and is therefore entitled to limit a minor's con-
stitutional rights.57 An abortion, however, is unique because of the
time limitation on the availability of an abortion and because of the
severe detriment imposed on teen girls by unwanted pregnancy and
motherhood. 58 Therefore, the Court, while limiting a teen girl's access
52. Id. at 75. Justice White, however, disagreed. In his opinion, in which he concurred in part
and dissented in part, Justice White held that the state had every right to protect minor children
from this irreversible decision by requiring parental consent. Id. at 95 (White, J., dissenting in
part and concurring in part). Justice White felt that 'parents needed to help their minor daugh-
ters in making such an important and difficult decision. Id. He stated that parental consent is
"the traditional way by which States have sought to protect children from their own immature
and improvident decisions; and there is absolutely no reason expressed by the majority why the
State may not utilize that method here." Id. Justice Stevens, in his separate concurring opinion,
also felt that the "State's interest in the welfare of its young citizens justifies a variety of protec-
tive measures." Dan forth, 428 U.S. at 102 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Stevens pointed out several things that minors are not allowed to do without parental
consent, including attending adult movies, working, traveling, and marrying. Id. However, with
respect to Justice Stevens, these activities certainly do not concern a citizen's need for and right
to privacy to the extent that an abortion does.
53. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 643.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 637.
58. See id. at 642. Justice Powell stressed the adult responsibility associated with having a
child. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642. Things would change, however, if the girl were to have the
child. She would likely be considered an adult in some ways, as she would be a parent. As a
parent, she would be legally entitled to make decisions concerning the care and control of her
own child, making her constitutional rights no longer limited as a minor, but fully developed as a
parent. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Were she to stay in school, however,
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to abortion, allowed for an alternative to the required parental con-
sent. The Court did not deny that a teen girl does have the right to
choose abortion for herself, regardless of her parents' wishes.5 9 Para-
doxically, the Court allowed the state to make an abortion more diffi-
cult for a girl to obtain, but did not allow the state to completely deny
her this right.60 This decision signals a decline in the rights of adoles-
cents, but not a total abandonment, because the Court acknowledged
that teen girls should not be denied a right that is guaranteed by the
Constitution. 61
C. Decline in the Rights of Minors: 1980s
During the 1980s, the Rehnquist Court limited severely the rights
that had previously been established for teens. Within the criminal
context, the Court eventually ruled that the death penalty may be ap-
plicable to minors who are sixteen or seventeen years old.62 Within
the school context, the Court limited the protections offered to high
school students by the First and Fourth Amendments.63 Finally, the
Court allowed states to require parental notification for a pregnant
teen to obtain an abortion, even without a judicial bypass provision. 64
1. Criminal Cases: Limit the Protection of Minors and Increase
Their Responsibility
The first of three criminal cases discussed in this section that deal
with teen offenders is Eddings v. Oklahoma.65 In Eddings, the Su-
preme Court considered the application of the death penalty to a de-
fendant who was sixteen years old at the time of his offense. 66 The
Court vacated Edding's death sentence because it was imposed with-
her rights would clearly be limited by the nature of the school and the need for discipline. This
makes for an interesting dilemma for the Court. This also illustrates the dilemma faced by soci-
ety regarding teens in general; they are not fully grown or mature, and therefore need to be
protected. However, biologically, they are able to become parents and, as parents, need to act
like adults and take responsibility, and they must also be given rights as adults in relation to their
children.
59. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 622.
60. Id.
61. See id. Perhaps the Court reached this result because there were other people involved,
not just one teen, but the father and the parents of both teens. Perhaps the Court was also
concerned about the impact that rampant teen pregnancy has on society, contributing to other
social problems, such as dependence on welfare, poverty, and the social and medical problems
that the children or the teens may have developed.
62. See infra notes 65-80 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 81-95 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
65. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
66. Id. at 105.
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out consideration of all mitigating factors.67 The trial court had re-
fused to consider evidence of the defendant's family history of abuse
and emotional problems.68 The Supreme Court reasoned that evi-
dence of such treatment is an important consideration, especially
when the defendant is so young.69 Justice Powell, writing for the
Court, stated that "when the defendant was 16-years-old at the time of
the offense there can be no doubt that evidence of a turbulent family
history, of beatings by a harsh father, and of severe emotional distur-
bance is particularly relevant. '70
Next, in Thompson v. Oklahoma,71 the Court concluded that the
Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of a person who was
under sixteen years old when he or she committed the offense. 72 Jus-
tice John Paul Stevens wrote that the death penalty for young teens
offended our standards of decency.73 He also wrote that one of the
reasons it offended "contemporary standards of decency" was that
"such a young person is not capable of acting with the degree of culpa-
bility that can justify the ultimate penalty. '74 This decision, however,
did not explicitly state that sixteen and seventeen-year-old adolescents
may be sentenced to death without violating the Eighth Amendment.
That decision came a year later in Stanford v. Kentucky.75 Justice
Antonin Scalia delivered the plurality opinion of the Court, conclud-
ing that a death sentence for a defendant who had committed a crime
at sixteen or seventeen years of age does not violate the Eighth
Amendment. 76 Such a sentence, the plurality concluded, was not
cruel or unusual; only a minority of states chose to prohibit capital
punishment for sixteen or seventeen-year-old offenders. 77 Justice
Scalia stated that the Court must look to American standards of de-
cency when deciding what is cruel and unusual punishment.78 Justice
Scalia focused on the fact that
67. Id. at 113-14.
68. Id. at 108.
69. Id. at 115. One wonders what happened to this reasoning in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492
U.S. 361 (1989). The majority in Stanford did not even consider these mitigating factors when
holding that a state may allow a sixteen-year-old to be sentenced to death without offending our
standards of decency. See id.
70. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115. Theoretically, such factors are always considered when deter-
mining whether a defendant might receive a penalty of death.
71. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
72. Id.
73. See id. at 823.
74. See id.
75. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 373.
78. Id. at 369.
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[o]f the 37 States whose laws permit capital punishment, 15 decline
to impose it upon 16-year-old offenders and 12 decline to impose it
on 17-year-old offenders. This does not establish the degree of na-
tional consensus this Court has previously thought sufficient to label
a particular punishment cruel and unusual. 79
Because a small majority of states that allows the death penalty allows
it for sixteen and seventeen-year-olds, the Court found that such capi-
tal punishment could not offend American standards of decency.80
2. School Cases: Limiting the Protection Offered by the First and
Fourth Amendments
The Court changed the rule it had promulgated in Tinker when it
decided Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.8' In Fraser, a high
school student made a "lewd" speech at a school function and was
disciplined for his use of profanity and vulgar language. 2 The student
challenged the school district's actions, claiming his speech was pro-
tected by the First Amendment. 83 The Court held that the student's
speech was not protected, reasoning that "the constitutional rights of
students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the
rights of adults in other settings. '8 4 One scholar has opined that the
Court concluded that speech of high school students may be limited
by the school, regardless of whether the content is vulgar or not, stat-
ing: "[T]he majority did not rely on the disruptive nature of the
speech for its conclusion. '85
79. Id. at 370-71. However, as pointed out in a newspaper article in 2001, "[a] slim majority
of the states-27-either ban the death penalty outright or prohibit it for juvenile murderers.
The most recent was Montana in 1999." Pamela Brogan, Moves To Ban Death Penalty for
Juveniles Gain Momentum, GANNETt NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 11, 2001, at GGN2. Brogan also
pointed out that "of [the] 23 states that permit the death penalty for juveniles, the 10 considering
legislation to ban executions are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Mis-
sissippi, Nevada, South Carolina, and Texas." Id. Perhaps Justice Scalia's argument about the
"national consensus" is or will be losing weight soon. And because the standards of decency are
evolving, perhaps the Court will have to update its moral compass, as the states seem to be
doing.
80. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 371. Interestingly, the dissent pointed out that the plurality does not
include in its numbers the states that do not permit the death penalty at all, giving the discussion
a "distorted view." Id. at 384 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
82. Id. at 678.
83. Id. at 679.
84. Id. at 682.
85. Michael J. Dale, The Supreme Court and the Minimization of Children's Constitutional
Rights: Implications for the Juvenile Justice System, 13 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 199, 213
(1992).
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Another case that limited students' speech in schools, Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier,86 allowed school districts to censor stu-
dent publications. In Hazelwood, the school principal objected to a
story written by students for the school newspaper about pregnancy
and another story about divorce.8 7 The principal decided that the
pages containing these stories were to be withheld from the publica-
tion.88 The Court held that the actions of the principal did not violate
the students' First Amendment rights, reasoning again that the rights
of students are not always the same as the rights of adults, and that
school officials may limit the speech as they deem appropriate. 89
In New Jersey v. T. L. 0,90 the Court also found a lesser standard for
the search and seizure of a student's belongings under the Fourth
Amendment than for the search and seizure of an adult's belongings.91
In T.L.O., a school official searched a student's purse.92 The Court
considered whether the Fourth Amendment was applicable to this ac-
tion and found that school officials require less cause to search a stu-
dent than the police require to search an adult.93 A school official's
search of a student need only be reasonable under the circumstances;
the official does not need probable cause, as a police officer does
when conducting a search outside of the school setting.94 One scholar
86. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
87. Id. at 263.
88. Id. at 264.
89. Id. at 266-67.
90. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 340-41. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
94. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 341. As Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent, for adults, warrant-
less searches are per se unreasonable, with a few exceptions. Id. at 354 (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Welsh v. Wis-
consin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); Steagald v. United
States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1
(1968); and Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) as exceptions to the warrant require-
ment). Justice Brennan also stated that police must have probable cause to conduct a search,
whether they have a warrant or whether they have an exception. Id. at 354-55. The police must
show that they had probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed and that "evi-
dence of the crime will be found in the place to be searched." Id. at 355 (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379
U.S. 89 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160 (1949)). Justice Brennan further argued that "intrusions that are substantially less in-
trusive than full-scale searches or seizures may be justifiable in accordance with a balancing test
even absent a warrant or probable cause, provided that the balancing test used gives sufficient
weight to the privacy interests that will be infringed." Id. Justice Brennan's problem with the
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has theorized that the Court made its decision based on its view of
high school life today and its significant drug and violence problem.95
3. Abortion Case: The Court Makes Abortion More Difficult for
Teen Girls to Obtain
In H.L. v. Matheson,96 the Court moved away from the judicial by-
pass rule laid out in Bellotti and Danforth. In this case, the Court
upheld a state statute requiring parental notification of a minor's deci-
sion to obtain an abortion without a judicial bypass provision. 97 The
Court reasoned that the parental notification provision did not require
parental consent and therefore did not give parents a veto power over
a minor's decision to have an abortion. 98 The Court found that "the
statute plainly serves the important consideration of family integrity
and protecting adolescents . . . . 99 One scholar concluded that the
Court's "approval of a parental notification statute with no judicial
alternatives effectively amounted to a reinforcement of the traditional
right of parents to control the upbringing of their children."' 100
D. Recent Cases: 1990s to Present
In the last decade, the Court has decided several cases that affect
teens. In 1998, the Court decided two cases concerning liability for
sexual harassment; both in school and in work settings.10 In 1995,
and again in 2002, the Court addressed the issue of random drug test-
ing of students in public high schools. 102 The decisions in both con-
texts limit the rights of teens and do not offer protection appropriate
for the situation. These cases will be the focus of Part III.
case was that the school substantially invaded the student's privacy by looking through her
purse. Id. Furthermore, he argued, the government needs a special interest, like "exigency," in
order to disregard the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 356. Clearly, no exigency existed in a situation
involving a student at school, likely being held in the principal's office.
95. See Dale, supra note 85, at 212.
96. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 411.
99. Id.
100. Michele D. Sullivan, From Warren to Rehnquist: The Growing Conservative Trend in the
Supreme Court's Treatment of Children, 65 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 1139, 1149 (1991). The Court
made several references in the opinion to family integrity and the need for parents to be in-
volved in these kinds of decisions.
101. See infra notes 103-114 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 115-124 and accompanying text.
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1. Liability for Sexual Harassment in Schools
In June 1998, the Court addressed the issue of liability for sexual
harassment in schools and in the workplace. In Gebser v. Lago Vista
Independent School District,0 3 the Court developed a two-pronged
standard to hold a school district liable in a private sexual harassment
suit under Title IX. First, a school official must have actual notice of
the teacher's harassment; second, the school official must be deliber-
ately indifferent to it.1°4 In Gebser, a high school student had sexual
intercourse with one of her teachers but did not report this to school
officials. 10 5 The Court refused to apply a standard akin to that of re-
spondeat superior and constructive notice. 106 Generally, to hold an
employer liable for the actions of its employee, one must prove only
that the employer should have known about the injurious conduct. 10 7
Instead, the Court concluded that Congress did not intend Title IX to
allow for such a recovery, and that actual notice must be given to an
"appropriate person" who has the "authority to take corrective action
to end the discrimination."10 8
2. Liability for Sexual Harassment in the Workplace
In contrast to Gebser, four days later, the Court decided another
sexual harassment case, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.10 9 In
Faragher, a woman brought suit against her former employer, the City
of Boca Raton, alleging that her supervisors had created a sexually
hostile environment by touching her and making offensive remarks.110
The district court found the employer liable under traditional agency
principles and vicarious liability."' The Supreme Court concluded
that an employer is vicariously liable for sexual harassment in the
workplace, but that the employer may offer the defense that its con-
103. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 278.
106. Id. at 288. In general, employers are liable for the actions of their employees under the
theory of respondeat superior. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (Tentative Draft No.
2, 2001). Under this theory, the employer is liable for what it knew or should have known (con-
structive notice) about the behavior of its employee. Id.
107. Employers, or principals, are responsible for the actions of their employees or agents
while in furtherance of their employment. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (2002).
If a person is injured by an employee of a business, he or she must prove that the employer knew
or should have known of the employee's conduct that caused the injury. Id.
108. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290.
109. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 783.
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duct was reasonable. 112 Therefore, an employee may bring a sexual
harassment suit and need only prove that the employer had construc-
tive knowledge, as required by principles of vicarious liability, and
that the employer's conduct was unreasonable. 13 This is in sharp con-
trast to the standard applied to girls in school under Gebser.114
3. Drug Testing in Schools
The Court has recently decided two cases regarding random drug
testing in schools. The first, Vernonia School District v. Acton,11 5 de-
cided in 1995, holds that a school district is constitutionally permitted
to require student athletes to submit to random drug testing. 116 The
Court concluded that the privacy interests of the students do not out-
weigh the interest of the school in preventing drug use by the ath-
letes.117 In 2002, the Court took Acton one step further by allowing
schools to randomly drug test any student participating in a competi-
tive extracurricular activity in Board of Education of Independent
School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls."8 In Earls,
the Court applied similar reasoning to that demonstrated in Acton.
Both Courts reasoned that schools have a custodial function over stu-
dents, and have an important interest in preventing drug use, out-
weighing any privacy interest the students may have.119
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, dissenting in both Acton and Earls,
disagreed. 120 She argued that drug testing, which constitutes a search
under the Fourth Amendment, should be based on individual suspi-
cion, which is the general requirement in Fourth Amendment cases.121
Here, the Court ignored students' privacy concerns and held the
school's general, or blanket, search constitutional. 122 Such a blanket
search, Justice O'Connor argued, interfered too greatly with students'
privacy to allow these types of searches. 123 Justice O'Connor noted,
"For most of our constitutional history, mass, suspicionless searches
112. Id. at 780.
113. See id. at 792.
114. See supra notes 103-108 and accompanying text.
115. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
116. Id.
117. See id. at 661.
118. 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
119. See id.
120. Acton, 515 U.S. at 666 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Earls, 536 U.S. at 842 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).




have been generally considered per se unreasonable within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment. '124
III. ANALYSIS: Too MUCH PROTECTION AND, AT THE SAME
TIME, NOT ENOUGH
Unfortunately, when one examines the cases, it is clear that the
United States Supreme Court, on one hand, is not protecting adoles-
cents and, on the other hand, is taking away their rights in the name of
protection. This section will analyze this conclusion in three contexts:
sexual harassment, school searches, and capital punishment. First, the
context of sexual harassment will be addressed. This section will ar-
gue that, similar to abortion rights for young girls, which are quickly
being narrowed, girls in public school are given less protection from
sexual harassment by teachers than women in the workplace get from
sexual harassment by supervisors. 125 The standard of liability for sex-
ual harassment is significantly higher for a school district than it is for
any other type of employer. This section will then analyze this conclu-
sion in light of the recent decisions concerning school-based searches
in the form of random drug testing.126 The Court allows such searches
and a lower form of constitutional protection for adolescents in school
because schools need to protect students from drug use.127 When
viewed as a whole, the Court does not, in fact, protect adolescents.
Minors do not receive the same protection as women in the work-
place, and furthermore, they are subject to the death penalty in cer-
tain situations.1 28 In either case, the adolescent loses rights and
protections; the adolescent is protected too much and, at the same
time, not enough.
A. Girls at School are Given Less Protection than Women in the
Workplace Against Sexual Harassment
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX) 129 states
that no student shall be discriminated against on the basis of sex.130
124. Id.
125. See infra notes 129-196 and accompanying text. This Comment uses "girls" to address
the issue of sexual harassment of students by teachers in the school setting. This is purely for the
convenience of the reader and author, in the interest of simplicity. While boys certainly can be,
and often are, sexually abused and harassed, the majority of such abuse and harassment, unfor-
tunately, happens to girls and women in this country-and around the world.
126. See infra notes 197-219 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 197-219 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 220-244 and accompanying text.
129. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).
130. See id.
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The Court has held sexual harassment and abuse to be a form of sex
discrimination.13 1 When teachers sexually abuse students, the school
district may be held liable for a claim of sexual harassment under Title
IX.132 This section will analyze two cases concerning employer liabil-
ity for sexual harassment, one in which a girl was harassed by a
teacher in her school, and another in which a woman was sexually
harassed at work. The inconsistencies between these two cases will
also be discussed.
1. Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District 133
In 1991, Alida Star Gebser was in the eighth grade in Lago Vista
Independent School District (Lago Vista). 134 She met a teacher in a
high school book discussion group and was assigned to this teacher's
class the next year when she entered high school. 135 The teacher
made inappropriate sexual comments during class and to Gebser
while they were alone together. 36 In the spring of Gebser's first year
of high school, her teacher began to have sexual intercourse with
her.137 This abuse continued through the summer and into the next
school year. 138 Gebser never reported this abuse to anyone, but in
1993, the police discovered that the teacher was having sex with
Gebser, and they arrested him. 139 Lago Vista fired the teacher and his
teaching license was revoked. 140
But when Gebser and her parents sued the school district in No-
vember 1993, they were rebuffed. 141 They sued Lago Vista for com-
pensatory and punitive damages under Title IX, and the district court
granted summary judgment to Lago Vista, rejecting the claim. 42 The
district court held that in order for the school district to be held liable,
it must have actual notice of the harassment and then fail to re-
spond. 143 Because Gebser did not report the abuse, the court held
131. Franklin v. Gwinnett County, 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992).
132. See id. at 76 (holding that a student who was sexually harassed by her teacher could sue
the school district under Title IX).
133. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
134. Id. at 277.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 278.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 278.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 278-79.
142. Id. at 279.
143. Id.
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that the school district did not have actual knowledge. 144 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, and refused to
use the common law standard of agency and principles of respondeat
superior to hold the employer liable for actions of the employee. 145
The Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts. Gebser argued
that the school district should be held liable under principles of re-
spondeat superior liability because the teacher's authority facilitated
the harassment. 146 She also argued that the school district should "at
a minimum be liable for damages based on a theory of constructive
notice, i.e., where the district knew or 'should have known' about har-
assment but failed to uncover or eliminate it.''147 The five-four major-
ity rejected these arguments. Justice O'Connor, writing for the
majority, reasoned that the breach of Title IX must be intentional, and
therefore required actual knowledge. 148 The Court's final holding was
that, in order to be held liable for damages under Title IX, a school
district must have actual notice of the harassment and must have acted
deliberately indifferent to it.149
2. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton 150
In contrast, that same month, the Court decided a case brought
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)' 5t that con-
cerned sexual harassment in the workplace. 152 Beth Ann Faragher
was a lifeguard in the city of Boca Raton, Florida. After Faragher
resigned from her job, she sued the City under Title VII for creating a
144. Id.
145. Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir. 1997), rev'd sub nom.,
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
146. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 282.
147. Id. (citing Brief for Petitioner at 28; Brief of Amicus Curiae for the United States at 15-
16). The petitioner argued for these two broader standards of liability for the school district. See
Gebser, 524 U.S. 274. Both standards would allow for a broader range of situations in which a
student who was sexually abused by her teacher could recover damages from the school district.
Id. Interestingly, the Government realized the need for a broader standard and argued for the
broader reading. Id. The Act does not explicitly confer a private right of action: the Court has
inferred that. Id. Therefore, the Act also does not state how liability should be determined. Id.
In the absence of any evidence of congressional intent within the Act, perhaps the Court might
have weighed the position of the United States a bit more heavily.
148. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 287.
149. Id. at 292.
150. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000). Title VII is part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which was
enacted to provide relief against discrimination in public accommodations and to end discrimina-
tion in employment and education. Id. Title VII is used to bring workplace sexual harassment
suits. Title IX, on the other hand, is part of the Education Amendments of 1972, and was en-
acted to provide for gender equality in education. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
152. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 775.
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"sexually hostile atmosphere." 153 She claimed that her male supervi-
sors were sexually offensive in their words and actions.154 Faragher
also claimed that the men touched her sexually without her permis-
sion. 155 Faragher never made a formal complaint about this behavior
to her employer, the City.156
The district court found this to be an "abusive working environ-
ment" and held the City liable for damages.1 57 The court found that
the City had constructive knowledge of this sexual harassment and
that the supervisors were acting as agents of the City. 158 However, the
district court awarded Faragher only one dollar. 159 The appellate
court reversed the decision because the supervisors were not acting
within the scope of their employment when harassing Ms. Faragher. a60
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the court of appeals and
remanded the case to enter judgment in favor of Faragher. 161 The
Court held that an employer must be held vicariously liable for such
harassment.1 62 In order for an employer to be vicariously liable, com-
mon law principles of agency require that the employee be acting
within the scope of his or her employment. 163 Sexual harassment is
obviously not within the scope of anyone's employment; however, the
Court deemed that the appropriate inquiry is whether the "harassing
behavior ought to be held within the scope of a supervisor's employ-
ment .... "164 The Court, looking to the Restatement (Second) of
Agency, suggested that such behavior is a risk that businesses should
bear, as it is a fairly common risk. 65 The Court ruled that, in today's
climate, sexual harassment happens so often that an employer must
anticipate this risk and be forced to bear it.1 66 Another reason the
Court considered such harassing behavior within the scope of employ-
153. Id. at 780.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 782.
157. Id. at 783.
158. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 783.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 784.
161. Id. at 786.
162. Id. at 802.
163. Id. at 793 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1957)).
164. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 797.
165. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229). It also seems that as a matter
of policy, the employer should be forced to bear this risk, rather than innocent employees who
have been harassed. It seems unfortunate that such behavior is now considered a risk to be
borne by employers. It is unfortunate that this flows from the fact that such behavior has be-
come so commonplace in society today.
166. See id. at 798.
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ment is that supervisors are supposed to create a safe working envi-
ronment. 167 Clearly, when a supervisor is consistently making
unwanted sexual advances-touching and making remarks-the em-
ployee cannot feel safe.168
Because the Court was able to define why sexual harassment should
be considered within the scope of employment, it was able to find the
City liable in this case.169 The Court did, however, create two ele-
ments of an affirmative defense to the charge of sexual harassment. 170
To assert properly the defense, the defendant employer must show:
(1) that it "exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly
any sexually harassing behavior"; and (2) that the victim unreasonably
failed to take advantage of these opportunities offered by the
employer.1 71
3. Inconsistencies Between the Two Cases
The conflict between these two cases is that the precedent set ap-
pears to protect women in the workplace from sexual harassment
more than it protects teenage girls in school. Logic dictates that girls
need more protection than adults in general; this argument gains
strength in the context of sexual harassment and abuse by a teacher or
authority figure. The two cases differ between the standard of liability
imposed on the defendant school district versus the defendant em-
ployer. The inconsistencies lie in the areas of knowledge and the de-
fendant's response to that knowledge.
a. The Issue of Knowledge
The first inconsistency between these cases is the issue of notice or
knowledge of the harrassment. Under Faragher, the victim need only
prove that the employer should have known about the harassment,
which can be demonstrated easily when the offender is in a supervi-
sory position over the harasser. 72 Presumably, supervisors should
know about their employees' conduct, because their job involves over-
167. Id. at 797.
168. Interestingly, teachers are also supposed to create a safe environment for their students
at school. Arguably, teachers have even more responsibility for safety than supervisors. During
school hours, teachers are charged with taking care of the minor students. This statement may
seem obvious, but the Court did not seem to consider this contention when deciding Gebser.
169. Id. at 797-98.
170. Id. at 807. The Court could not hold an employer automatically liable for sexual harass-
ment by a supervisor because of the principle of stare decisis. The Court had previously held, in
Meritor Savings Bank, FAB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), that an employer is not "automati-
cally" liable for harassment by an employee in a supervisory position. Fargher, 524 U.S. at 804.
171. Id. at 807.
172. See supra notes 150-171 and accompanying text.
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seeing, keeping track of, and supervising the worker. A victim of sex-
ual harassment is likely to show that her supervisor should have
known about the conduct, especially if it happened at the workplace.
Conversely, under Gebser, a student must prove that the school dis-
trict had actual knowledge of the harassment. 173 This essentially
means that the student must report the fact that her teacher is sexually
abusing174 her to a school official. 175 As one scholar has noted, this is
an unreasonable expectation. 176 An adolescent girl will not likely re-
port the abuse for several reasons, including the following: that she is
afraid or embarrassed, 177 that she does not want to get into trouble,
that she does not want to get the teacher into trouble, or that she may
not even believe that the conduct is wrong. The facts in Gebser affirm
such behavior-the abuse was never reported by the student who was
being abused.178 Alida Gebser, the plaintiff, never reported the abuse
to a school official. 179 Instead, the police discovered that the teacher
was having sexual intercourse with Gebser, and he was arrested. 80
173. See supra notes 133-149 and accompanying text.
174. The term abuse, rather than harassment, is used because in the context of sexual harass-
ment of a student by a teacher, the conduct is abusive. Having sex with a minor is a crime, as is
sexual touching. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12-14.1(a)(1) (2002).
175. See Gebser, 524 U.S. 274.
176. Amy K. Graham, Note, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District: The Supreme
Court's Determination That Children Deserve Less Protection Than Adults from Sexual Harass-
ment, 30 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 551, 587 (1999). Graham noted that "[u]nder the actual knowledge
standard, the victimized student essentially has an affirmative duty to report the harassment to a
responsible school official." Id. Requiring the student to report will result in less liability for
school districts, less protection for teen girls, and "injustice, rendering Title IX ineffective." Id.
at 586.
177. Id. at 586.
178. Gebser, 524 U.S. 274.
179. Id. at 278. "Gebser did not report the relationship to school officials, testifying that while
she realized [her teacher's] conduct was improper, she was uncertain how to react and wanted to
continue having him as a teacher." Id. While not given any other facts, one might also hypothe-
size that Gebser had romantic feelings for this teacher and wanted the relationship to continue.
Young girls often have "crushes" on teachers, but that does not make a sexual relationship be-
tween that young girl and the teacher appropriate. It is still abuse, no matter how the young girl,
a child, feels about it.
180. Id. In addition to having sexual intercourse with his underage student, the teacher, Frank
Waldrop, made sexually suggestive comments to the students during a book discussion group
while Gebser was still in the eighth grade. Id. at 277. Waldrop began addressing his comments
more directly to Gebser during the next school year when, after she entered high school, she was
assigned to his class. Id. at 278. Waldrop did not initiate sexual contact until that spring, when
he visited Gebser at her home, "ostensibly to give her a book, he kissed and fondled her."
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 278. He then began having sexual intercourse with Gebser on a regular basis
for the rest of that school year, through the summer, and into the following school year. Id. The
Court noted that "they often had intercourse during class time, although never on school prop-
erty." Id. Thus, it seems that, for Gebser, this abuse began before she got to high school and
continued well into her second year.
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Not only is the effect detrimental to teens because it becomes more
difficult to hold a school district liable in cases of sexual harassment, it
is detrimental because so many cases of abuse will go unreported. For
all of the reasons stated above, a teen girl is extremely unlikely to
report sexual harassment by a teacher. This increases the probability
that the school district will not be held liable for the abuse, and conse-
quently that the abuse will continue. Additionally, this standard cre-
ates a significant burden on teen girls to report abuse. Courts and
school districts should be doing everything in their power to protect
young students from sexual abuse, and yet this holding will have the
opposite effect. This knowledge requirement protects school districts
from liability and creates an environment in which the student is never
encouraged to report abuse, thus serving only to perpetuate it on an
institutional and an individual level. Students in general will suffer
more abuse, and students individually-like Alida Gebser-will suffer
the abuse for longer periods of time.
This actual knowledge standard also creates an incentive for school
districts to stay ignorant about sexual harassment in school. 181 They
are "rewarded for remaining ignorant of any harassment taking place
in their schools. 182 If a school official does not actually know of the
abuse, the district cannot be liable.183
b. The Issue of the Defendant's Response
The second inconsistency between these two cases is the issue of the
defendant's response to the knowledge that the plaintiff is being sexu-
ally harassed. A school district must deliberately (or intentionally)
disregard the knowledge in order to be held liable. 184 Under
Faragher, the employer's conduct was analyzed under a reasonable-
ness standard. 185 It is much easier for a victim to show that the defen-
dant acted unreasonably than to show that the defendant intentionally
did nothing to help. All of this points to the obvious conclusion that a
non-school district employer will be held liable for sexual harassment
much more often than a school district will. Therefore, adult employ-
ees at work are afforded more protection and recourse than students
at school.
181. Graham, supra note 176, at 588.
182. Id. at 587 (citing James C. Harrington, Fifth Circuit Survey June 1996-May 1997: Civil
Rights, 29 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 442, 443 (1998)).
183. See generally Gebser, 524 U.S. 274.
184. Id.
185. See generally Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
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To add more support to this argument, one scholar notes that school
is mandatory for girls, while work is not. 18 6 School is a student's work,
so why not treat it in the same manner? If students cannot expect the
same constitutional rights as adults because schools must protect stu-
dents, and therefore take away some constitutional rights, then this
result makes no logical sense. A supervisor in the workplace has a
duty to create a safe environment and, therefore, the employer can be
held liable for the supervisor's sexual harassment. 187 A teacher at
school has an even greater duty than a supervisor has, a fact that the
Court neglected to observe. Schools are entrusted to take care of chil-
dren, to act as their parents for the duration of the school day. Sexual
abuse by a parent is a crime condemned by society as one of the worst
possible crimes, so why not hold school teachers and administrators to
that same standard? It seems that a school district, charged with pro-
tecting and educating minors, should be held to the highest standard
of liability.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in her dissenting opinion in Gebser,
concluded that the standard of liability for sexual harassment in public
schools should be similar to that used in Faragher.18 8 She would re-
quire a plaintiff who brings a sexual harassment claim under Title IX,
as Gebser did, to show only that the school district knew or should
have known about the abuse, a standard akin to common law princi-
ples of agency and constructive knowledge. 189 Justice Ginsburg would
also allow the district an affirmative defense. 190 She would allow the
school district defendant to show that it has "an effective policy for
186. See Graham, supra note 176, at 594.
187. See Faragher, 524 U.S. 775.
188. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 307 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
189. See id. Justice Stevens also wrote a dissenting opinion, which Justice Ginsburg joined. In
his dissent, Justice Stevens purported that the resolution to this case should be a simple one. See
id. at 294 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Under a previous case decided unanimously by the Court,
Franklin v. Gwinnet County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992), a student who had been sexually
harassed by a teacher could recover damages from the school district under Title IX. See
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 294-95. In that case, Justice Stevens stated, the Court had considered the
legislative intent of Title IX and had concluded that Congress had intended Title IX to include
"all appropriate remedies, unless it expressly indicat[ed] otherwise." Id. at 295. Justice Stevens
also noted that previous decisions by the Court had held that Title IX should be read and inter-
preted broadly. Id. at 296. Therefore, according to Justice Stevens, the majority rejected stare
decisis. Id. at 297 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As he stated, the answer is found in a previous case:
Franklin therefore stands for the proposition that sexual harassment of a student by her
teacher violates the duty-assumed by the school district in exchange for federal
funds-not to discriminate on the basis on sex, and that a student may recover damages
from a school district for such a violation.
Id.
190. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 307.
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reporting and redressing such misconduct.' ' 191 Additionally, the vic-
tim must have failed to take advantage of the policy in order to re-
ceive damages. 192 This defense is strikingly similar to that allowed in
Faragher, and seems to be offered as a compromise position.193
The most appalling aspect of these inconsistent cases is the disparity
between the two behaviors at issue. The harassing behavior at issue in
Gebser was a teacher having sex with his student.194 The harassing
behavior at issue in Faragher consisted of sexual comments that made
work uncomfortable for Faragher. 195 In Gebser, the behavior was not
sexual harassment, it was sexual abuse, and yet the victim cannot re-
cover from the offender's employer. 196 Gebser and her parents
should be allowed to hold this teacher's employer, the school district,
responsible for the pain and abuse he caused. It is obvious that he was
able to use his position of power and authority over Gebser in order
to abuse her. The fact that parents and students who have been
abused are not able to receive compensation for their losses is sadden-
ing. This family, and especially this teen girl, will likely need to seek
extensive professional therapy in order to heal. However, women
who are injured by sexual harassment in the workplace are much
more likely to recover compensation, and to feel a sense of empower-
ment when they are able to seek and receive an appropriate remedy in
a court of law.
One might counter that the cure for such a disparity in the standard
should be a legislative concern, and that the legislature should amend
the laws to include the cause of action and the standard of liability.
This argument fails because if the Court had held that it was a legisla-
tive concern, it should not have decided on any standard of liability.
The Court decided to rule on the subject, and ruled on each case with-
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See generally Graham, supra note 176 (positing that Ginsburg's position would help stu-
dents be free from sexual harassment while at the same time mitigating damages suffered by
school districts).
194. It is not mentioned in the case, but one hopes that this teacher was held criminally liable
and punished appropriately.
195. This statement is not in any way meant to minimize the seriousness of sexual harassment
in the workplace and the pain that it can cause to its victims. It is merely meant to show the
disparity between the two behaviors and to show the inconsistency with which the Court treated
these two cases, decided four days apart.
196. Congress amended Title IX to eliminate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. 42
U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (2000). This is another clear example of the legislative intent to keep
Title IX liability on a broader scale. Clearly, if a state agency is receiving federal funds, it should
be required to comply with federal antidiscrimination laws.
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out regard to the other, leaving the results inconsistent with each
other and with justice.
B. The Cost of Protection and Inconsistent Results
While students are not being adequately protected from sexual har-
assment, students' Fourth Amendment1 97 rights are being violated in
the name of "protection." This same Court is also allowing adoles-
cents to be sentenced to death. The two most recent examples of this
contradiction are the Court's decisions in Board of Education of Inde-
pendent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls1 98 and
Stanford v. Kentucky.199 This section will first analyze Earls and how
the Court purports to protect students.2°° Next, capital punishment
for teens will be analyzed under Stanford.20 1
1. Too Much Protection at the Expense of Fourth Amendment
Rights: Board of Education of Independent School District
No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls20 2
In Earls, the Court took T.L.O.20 3 and Acton20 4 a step further.
Prior to Earls, students in public schools were already subject to
searches that adults would not be subject to, hence minimizing their
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches.20 5
The Court in T. L. 0. created a lower standard for searches at school;
probable cause is not needed to search a student.20 6 Acton held that
student athletes were subject to random drug testing because the
school needed to protect students from the serious drug problems
teens face today, and the school was especially concerned about drug
use among athletes.20 7 In Earls, the challenged school policy allowed
random drug testing for any student participating in extracurricular
activities.208 The Court held that the policy did not violate students'
Fourth Amendment rights because it "is a reasonably effective means
197. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
198. 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
199. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
200. See infra notes 202-219 and accompanying text.
201. See infra notes 220-244 and accompanying text.
202. 536 U.S. 822.
203. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
204. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
205. See supra notes 81-95 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 115-124 and accompanying text.
208. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825 (2002).
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of addressing the School District's legitimate concerns in preventing,
deterring, and detecting drug use. '20 9
The Juvenile Law Center, in an amicus curiae brief in support of the
student, argued that these searches were unconstitutional because
they were blanket searches and not based on any individualized suspi-
cion.210 Allowing these blanket searches lowers the constitutional
protection for students even further than they already sit.211 The brief
also argued that such searches limit students' abilities to learn by par-
ticipating in these activities. 212 After-school activities are a large part
of a student's high school education, and a student who does not wish
to submit to drug testing loses out on this important part of student
life.213
Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent, pointed out another flaw with the
Court's reasoning. 2 4 If the school wished to protect students from the
dangers of drug use, such a policy would not be effective.2 15 She
noted: "Nationwide, students who participate in extracurricular activ-
ities are significantly less likely to develop substance abuse problems
209. Id. at 837. In an amicus curiae brief in support of Earls, the Juvenile Law Center argued
that "[an inflated fear of school violence does not justify mass, suspicion-less searches for non-
violent behavior." Brief of Amici Curiae Juvenile Law Center et al. at 20, Pottawatomie County
v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (No. 01-332). The Juvenile Law Center argued that, even though
the youth crime rate is dropping, "fear of out-of-control children has increased dramatically over
the past several years and driven the misperception that school violence is on the rise and associ-
ated with drug use." Id. at 20-21. Therefore, they argue, "school officials are increasingly taking
on the issues of school security in a heavy-handed manner," such as widespread random drug
testing of students. Id. at 23. "While the use of such strategies seems temptingly effective in
combating drug use among teens, the foundation for mass, suspicion-less searches-namely con-
cern for school safety-is belied by research showing that schools are safe and that violence
remains an aberration of youthful behavior." Id. Furthermore, the Juvenile Law Center argued,
"A school district's desire to foster drug abstinence in an environment where there is neither a
history of drug use nor violent/criminal activity must not be permitted to make suspicion-less
searching become the norm rather than the exception." Id. at 22-23.
210. Brief of Amici Curiae Juvenile Law Center et al. at 5, Earls, (No. 01-332). This "suspi-
cion standard" is the one adopted in T.L.O., which is lower than the probable cause standard,
which is required by the Fourth Amendment for searches of adults. See supra notes 90-95 and
accompanying text.
211. Brief of Amici Curiae Juvenile Law Center et al. at 5, Earls, (No. 01-332).
212. Id. at 13.
213. Id. The Juvenile Law Center also argued that "[i]f permitted, generalized drug testing of
every public school student will become as routine and inflexible as other "zero tolerance" mea-
sures that punish children by depriving them of school involvement." Id. at 26. The Juvenile
Law Center also stated that such zero tolerance policies have "[a]bsurd consequences of this
one-size-fits-all mentality." Id. at 27. The brief cites one absurd example, "In West Virginia, a
seventh grader who shared a zinc cough drop with a classmate was suspended for three days
pursuant to the school's anti-drug policy because the cough drop was not cleared with the of-
fice." Id.
214. Earls, 536 U.S. at 842 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
215. See id.
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than are their less-involved peers.121 6 Justice Ginsburg argued that
the school district was testing the wrong students.217 Furthermore,
Justice Ginsburg argued, "Even if students might be deterred from
drug use in order to preserve their extracurricular eligibility, it is at
least as likely that other students might forgo their extracurricular in-
volvement in order to avoid detection of their drug use. ' '2 1tl Thus, the
students who really need protection from drug abuse are probably not
getting the help they need. Meanwhile, all students are paying the
price through the diminishment of their constitutional rights.2 19
2. Not Enough Protection at the Expense of Adolescent Lives:
Stanford v. Kentucky 220
The Court has held that a teen may be constitutionally subject to
the death penalty. This certainly cannot be a way to protect adoles-
cents, like the Court purports to do. The United States is one of six
countries that permit a juvenile to be sentenced to death.221 Clearly,




219. As one scholar noted, "Except to the extent legislators remember their childhoods and
can analogize across decades to present-day juvenile life, there is no check of the sort exper-
ienced by a lawmaker setting rules under which he or she must live." Susannah Z. Ringel, Com-
ment, Fourth Amendment Protection of Public School Students: Legal and Psychological
Inconsistencies, 3 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 289 (1992). Ringel also pointed out that
"[t]he lessened standard of protection from unwarranted searches and seizures applied to stu-
dents is inconsistent with established theory and practices of juvenile justice in ... United States
Supreme Court law." Id.
220. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
221. Sherri Jackson, Note, Too Young To Die-Juveniles and the Death Penalty-A Better Al-
ternative to Killing Our Children: Youth Empowerment, 22 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CON-
FINEMENT 391 (1996) (citing Letter from Amnesty International to President Clinton, United
States of America: Open Letter to the President on the Death Penalty 8 (Jan. 14, 1994)). In
addition to the United States, six other countries allow juveniles to be executed. Amnesty Inter-
national has documented these executions, and found, since January 1993, twenty-four execu-
tions of child offenders worldwide-one in the Democratic Republic of Congo, one in Nigeria,
one in Yemen, two in Pakistan, three in Iran, and sixteen in the United States. Pakistan and
Yemen have since legislated to abolish such use of the death penalty, as did the world's main
executing country, China, in 1997. Press Release, Amnesty International, USA: Indecent and
Internationally Illegal, the Death Penalty Against Child Offenders (Sept. 25, 2002), available at
www.web.amnesty.org./library/Index/engamr511432002 (last visited Jan. 26, 2004). Justice Scalia,
in his opinion in Stanford, questioned whether this statistic should be relevant to the discussion.
Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369 n.1. Justice Scalia pointed out that the Court's job is to interpret the
Constitution of the United States, which does not take its values from other countries. Id. He
stated in his majority opinion, "We emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency that
are dispositive, rejecting the contention of petitioners and their various amici ... that the sen-
tencing practices of other countries are relevant." Id.
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mane.222 Many scholars have argued against this practice. One argu-
ment pertains to deterrence, which is often cited as justification for
the death penalty. 223 As one scholar noted, "[I]t is important to con-
sider a juvenile's perception of death and whether juveniles tend to
act in a cold and calculated manner, or in the heat of passion. '224 So-
cial scientists have noted that adolescents do not possess the maturity
of judgment to appreciate such future consequences and that "now" is
most important to them.225 In this respect, perhaps the death penalty
cannot really deter an adolescent, especially one who is angry enough
to commit a heinous crime such as murder.
One might argue that setting any age limit on the death penalty is
arbitrary. The age of eighteen is just as arbitrary as the age of sixteen
and, therefore, there is no difference between sentencing a sixteen-
year-old to death and sentencing an eighteen-year-old to death. This
argument fails because society has historically chosen age limits for
which to allow children certain privileges. Teens can drive when they
are sixteen, they can vote when they are eighteen, they can drink alco-
hol when they are twenty-one. 226 Some age limit must always be
drawn, and society has deemed that teens become mature enough for
certain activities at particular age levels. Any age is arbitrary, but
what is the alternative? Determine case by case how mature the teen
might be? There would be no end; a number must be drawn. As
pointed out by Justice William J. Brennan in his dissent in Stanford:
Insofar as age 18 is a necessarily arbitrary social choice as a point at
which to acknowledge a person's maturity and responsibility, given
the different developmental rates of individuals, it is in fact "a con-
servative estimate of the dividing line between adolescence and
adulthood." Many of the psychological and emotional changes that
222. In fact, the United States has ratified an international treaty, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, which prohibits the execution of juveniles. Press Release, Amnesty
International, supra note 221. However, the United States reserved the right to execute child
offenders. Id. "The relevant expert UN body has found the US 'reservation' to be invalid, but
the US has ignored its finding." Id. In addition, noted Amnesty International, "[slince 1990, 191
countries have ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, one of the treaties banning the
use of the death penalty against children who were under 18 years old at the time of the crime.
Only Somalia and the USA have failed to ratify." Id.
223. See Jackson supra note 221, at 417 (citing Press Release, Amnesty International, supra
note 221, at 9).
224. Id. at 418.
225. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988).
226. This seems almost ironic, that nineteen-year-old teens are deemed by the state to be
mature enough to appreciate the consequences of their actions, enough so that they can receive
the ultimate irreversible punishment, but they cannot buy beer.
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an adolescent experiences in maturing do not actually occur until
the early 20s.227
Moreover, something does not seem right when one looks at the
numbers already drawn. For example, the legal age to drink alcohol
has been set at twenty-one. Society deems it necessary to protect
teens from the dangers of alcohol use until they are twenty-one-
three years older than eighteen. This implies that eighteen must not
be considered very mature. In fact, most teens are still in high school
when they turn eighteen. If an eighteen-year-old is not mature
enough to appreciate the consequences of drinking alcohol, and needs
to be protected, how is an even younger adolescent of sixteen sup-
posed to be mature enough to appreciate the consequences of a crime
and of the value of his life? Does that teen not need to be protected
as well? As one scholar notes, "Juveniles lack the degree of responsi-
bility for their crimes and, therefore, imposition of the death penalty is
unconstitutional under all circumstances. '2 2 8
Some proponents of the death penalty might argue that if a person
can commit a crime so heinous as intentional murder, that person de-
serves to die and should be forced to bear the consequences of his or
her actions. Most people would say that a sixteen or seventeen-year-
old certainly has the ability to act intentionally and therefore should
pay the price for the crime committed. This argument fails because
under the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids cruel
and unusual punishment, 229 there must exist a proportionate relation-
ship between the punishment and the defendant's level of blamewor-
thiness and culpability. 230 Adolescents under the age of eighteen are
routinely forbidden rights and privileges freely given to adults, the un-
derlying notion being that adolescents are not as responsible as adults
and that adults need to protect teens. When society deems that ado-
lescents are not responsible enough to vote, how can that same society
expect that adolescents can be held responsible enough to receive a
death sentence? Additionally, as Justice Brennan pointed out in his
dissent in Stanford:
[M]inors are treated differently from adults in our laws, which re-
flects the simple truth derived from communal experience that
juveniles as a class have not the level of maturation and responsibil-
227. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 396 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Brief of Amici Curiae Ameri-
can Society for Adolescent Psychiatry at 4).
228. See Jackson, supra note 221, at 411-12.
229. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
230. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 393 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ity that we presume in adults and consider desirable for full partici-
pation in the rights and duties of modern life. 231
Additionally, minors on death row "appear typically to have a bat-
tery of psychological, emotional, and other problems going to their
likely capacity for judgment and level of blameworthiness. '232 Justice
Brennan cited psychological studies that showed that most juvenile
inmates on death row had a psychiatric diagnosis, including psychosis,
severe mood disorders, paranoia, and head injuries. 233 Only two in-
mates studied had an Intelligence Quotient in the normal range, and
all but two had been abused-physically and sexually.234 This evi-
dence demonstrates that these adolescents are the most vulnerable in
our society and the most in need of adult protection. They are also
the least likely to be able to appreciate the consequences of what they
have done.235 Similarly, some people who are mentally retarded can-
not fully appreciate the consequences of their actions. Therefore, in
2002, the Court, in Atkins v. Virginia, held that the death penalty for
mentally retarded defendants violated the Eighth Amendment.2 36 It
is unclear why the Court chooses to protect the mentally disabled
from the ultimate punishment but not teens, who, due to their mental
231. Id. at 395 (Brennan, J., dissenting). One might say that the plurality in this opinion wants
to deny teens most of the rights given to adults but at the same time wants to hold them to the
same responsibility.
232. Id. at 398 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. One scholar has commented on adolescent brain development, suggesting that the ado-
lescent brain is not as fully developed as the adult brain. See Jane Rutherford, Juvenile Justice
Caught Between The Exorcist and A Clockwork Orange, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 715 (2002).
"Neuroscience data, however, suggests that there are developmental differences in the brain's
biochemistry and anatomy that may limit adolescents' ability to perceive risks, control impulses,
understand consequences, and control emotions." Id. at 716 (citing Francis J. Lexcon & Dickon
Repuci, Effects of Psychopathology on Adolescent Medical Decision-Making, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 63, 77-78 (1998)). Therefore, Rutherford stated, "adolescents may be more prone
to emotional outbursts and even violence." Id. Adolescent differences "are exacerbated by
psychosocial conditions that render youth more susceptible to peer influences and less likely to
be deterred by consequences." Id. at 716 (citing Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The
Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective of Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 171 (1997)).
236. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). Justice Stevens, in the first paragraph of the Atkins decision, stated:
"Because of their disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses,
however, they do not act with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious
adult criminal conduct." Id. at 306. The defendant, Daryl Renard Atkins, and another man,
William Jones, abducted a man using a handgun, took his money, drove him to an automated
teller machine and forced him to withdraw additional cash, then shot him eight times, killing the
victim. Id. at 307. The defendants were recorded by cameras at the automated teller machine.
Id. Both defendants testified as to the same story, but both stated that the other had shot and
killed the victim. Id. The jury believed defendant Jones and found that Atkins had been the
shooter. Id.
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immaturity, could easily be protected using the same reasoning.237
For example, one scholar has noted that "the prefrontal lobe of the
brain that mediates emotional impulses generated by the amygdala
does not fully develop until sometime between the ages of twenty-five
and thirty. ' 238 Similarly, in Atkins, Justice Stevens discussed the fact
that mentally retarded persons have "diminished capacities to under-
stand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from mis-
takes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to
control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others. 239
If our goal as a society is to protect teens, who are still children,
then we should not turn our back at the age of sixteen. 240 In sum-
mary, these decisions by the Supreme Court cannot be reconciled.
Are we protecting adolescents or are we really disenfranchising them?
237. Clearly, certain Members of the Court do not agree that the two groups are the same, or
are deserving of the same protections. For example, Atkins appealed his sentence to the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court, which upheld the death penalty for Atkins. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534
S.E.2d 312. 318 (Va. 2000). The Virginia court was "not willing to commute Atkins' sentence of
death to life imprisonment merely because of his IQ score." Id. at 321. The dissent, however,
felt that the defendant's mental age was between nine and twelve years of age, and that the
death penalty was excessive. Id. at 325 (Koontz, J., dissenting).
238. See Rutherford, supra note 234, at 726. Rutherford noted that brain development is
gradual, and therefore advocates not always holding teens morally culpable for that which they
cannot fully control, certainly not to the extent that they may be sentenced to die. See id.
239. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. These characteristics are strikingly similar to those noted by
Professor Rutherford. See Rutherford, supra note 235. Interestingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in
his dissent in Atkins, did not consider this evidence of mental and moral culpability. Atkins, 536
U.S. at 321-37 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Chief Justice considered only statistics relating to
jury decisions and decisions of state legislatures as indicative of whether executing the mentally
disabled is within our evolving standard of decency. Id. As far as Justice Rehnquist was con-
cerned, "[tihere are strong reasons for limiting our inquiry into what constitutes an evolving
standard of decency under the Eighth Amendment to the laws passed by legislatures and the
practices of sentencing juries in America." Id. at 328. These, he stated, are "well-established
objective indicators of contemporary values." Id. The Chief Justice made only minimal refer-
ence to the defendants' mental state, as they "indisputably are competent to stand trial, aware of
the punishment they are about to suffer and why, and [their] mental retardation has been found
an insufficiently compelling reason to lessen their individual responsibility for the crime." Id. at
321. The Chief Justice seemed to miss the point made by the majority, not that the mentally
retarded defendant should not be held responsible, or that he does not know what is happening,
but that he should not be killed by the state because of his insufficient mental capabilities. Simi-
larly, Justice Scalia, in his dissent, argued that the majority's decision "rested so obviously upon
nothing but the personal views of its members." Id. at 338 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia
argued that the jury had heard evidence about the defendant's mental retardation and had sen-
tenced him to death anyway, because of the brutality of the crime, and the defendant's criminal
history. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 338-39. "[P]etitioner's mental retardation was a central issue at sen-
tencing. The jury concluded, however, that his alleged retardation was not a compelling reason
to exempt him from the death penalty in light of the brutality of his crime and his long demon-
strated propensity for violence." Id. at 339.
240. As the Court stated in Atkins, "A claim that punishment is excessive is judged not by the
standards that prevailed in 1685 when Lord Jeffreys presided over the 'Bloody Assizes' or when
the Bill of Rights was adopted, but rather by those that currently prevail." Id. at 311.
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The answer, unfortunately, is that adolescents are being taught how
unimportant they are to society, and we are reinforcing the modern
stereotypes of "those terrible teens." The Court-and society-is in a
difficult position. Teens need some protection; they are not yet adults
and lack the experience and maturity to deal with difficult situations.
Teens also need to be given constitutional protections, which would be
akin to treating them more like adults. How do we give teens the
right amount of protection and responsibility? This question has been
plaguing parents for years. However, the Court has made some incon-
sistent decisions that are affecting the everyday lives of teens in and
out of school. Teens are not being protected at school in some ways
(i.e., recovery for sexual harassment) 241 and are not given constitu-
tional rights in other ways (i.e., searches). 242 The most vulnerable
teens, the ones who are committing terrible crimes, are expected to
take on the same responsibility as adults, but are not given the same
basic constitutional protections in their schools. 243  For example,
under Earls and Stanford, an adolescent boy may be subjected to a
bodily search at school, without a warrant, probable cause, or even
any suspicion-a search to which an adult would never be legally sub-
jected; but if that boy is extremely troubled and commits a heinous
crime, such as murder, he will be tried as an adult, and can be sen-
tenced to death, without any attempt to rehabilitate him.
Along with this inconsistent treatment of adolescents by adults
comes another problem. Society acts as a guide for teens and teaches
them how to act; during the teen years, children grow up and learn
appropriate standards of conduct. These differing standards are so
difficult for teens because they are trying to learn how to act as adults,
but are then taught two different standards. They are treated differ-
ently, and yet are expected to learn to conform to the adult standard.
They are given no significant guidance in what constitutes appropriate
behavior; in some situations, they are expected to act like children,
not deserving of adult rights and in other situations, they are expected
to act like adults, and pay the consequences if they cannot. 244
241. See supra notes 129-195 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 197-219 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 220-244 and accompanying text.
244. Professor Rutherford provided a useful example of the variance among teens. She noted
that, "[b]ecause the prefrontal lobe is not fully mature, teens are almost inevitably overly emo-
tional and subject to wide mood swings." See Rutherford, supra note 235, at 727. She also noted
that some teens will be able to control their impulses, while others will not:
If a teen has had relatively little experience with violence, she is less likely to read
social cues as threatening (perhaps naively so) thereby putting less strain on her
prefrontal lobe. As a result, she will be more able to control her impulses. However, if
a teen has had a number of violent experiences, he is likely to read cues as more threat-
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IV. IMPACT: TEENS ARE SENT THE WRONG MESSAGE
Part IV will discuss the significant impact on adolescents in the
United States as a result of the above mentioned inconsistent deci-
sions offered by the Supreme Court. This impact can only be de-
scribed as destructive to the lives of adolescents. The message sent to
teens is that they are not as valuable to society as adults and that we
will no longer seek to rehabilitate juvenile offenders. Additionally,
school districts are given an incentive to remain ignorant about sexual
abuse or harassment by teachers, because if the school district does
not actually know about the behavior, it cannot be held liable for al-
lowing it to happen. This incentive will thus create an environment in
which teens are not encouraged to talk about the inappropriate be-
havior of their teachers, further relegating them to a position in
society at which adolescents enjoy fewer rights but just as much re-
sponsibility as adults.
A. By Not Giving Teens the Same Constitutional Protections, We
Are Teaching Them That They Are Not as Important
to Society as Adults
It is at school that children learn a great deal about who they are
and how they fit into society. School plays an important role in shap-
ing the adult into which the young person will grow. School is also
where students learn about the Constitution, and unfortunately, how
it does not always apply to them. As Justice Stevens wrote in his dis-
sent in T.L.O.:
Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential to the
meaningful exercise of rights and responsibilities by a self-governing
citizenry. If the Nation's students can be convicted through the use
of arbitrary methods destructive of personal liberty, they cannot
help but feel that they have been dealt with unfairly.245
Justice Stevens went on to argue that it would be an important lesson
to our children to apply constitutional criminal procedure to their ac-
ening thereby putting a larger strain 7on his immature prefrontal lobe. As a result, he
is more likely to react violently.
Id. at 728. Professor Rutherford also pointed out that less serious crime by teens "may be more
deterrable." Id. This variance among teen behaviors illustrates that fact that teens do not have
proper guidance and are not capable of fully understanding appropriate behavior, especially
when it comes to violence. So why are we punishing them for this ignorance, which is proven to
be biological? As Professor Rutherford stated, "As the boundary between adults and children is
pushed to ever younger ages, we are virtually eradicating the concept of adolescence." Id. at
715.
245. New Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325, 373-74 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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tions and to their schools. 246 He felt that because the student had
been searched without a warrant, the evidence found against him
should be excluded pursuant to the exclusionary rule.247 Justice Ste-
vens stated that to apply the exclusionary rule "in criminal proceed-
ings arising from illegal school searches makes an important statement
to young people that 'our society attaches serious consequences to a
violation of constitutional rights' and that this is a principle of 'liberty
and justice for all.' "248
When we teach our children and teens that they are less valuable
members of society, they will begin to believe it. When teens begin to
believe that they are less valuable in society, clearly, problems can
develop. Teens will then be taught not to value themselves, and when
this happens, teens get into trouble. As a result, an increase in vio-
lence and dropout rates may occur. Justice Stevens, in his dissent in
T.L.O., was also concerned about the values that students learn at
school. He noted that "[tihe schoolroom is the first opportunity most
citizens have to experience the power of government. ' 249 Through
this powerful teaching and learning vehicle-the school-the Court
allows the state to teach the wrong lesson to adolescent students; Jus-
tice Stevens commented that the majority decision in T.L.O. "is a cu-
rious moral for the Nation's youth. '250
As one scholar has pointed out, children need to feel in control of
their personal belongings: privacy is very important to teens, and
when parents and teachers do not respect that, teens may become an-
gry.251 This privacy "may be crucial to their healthy development. '252
Also, teens should be treated on par with adults, as they will soon be
the future civic leaders of this country.253 The danger of the current
state of the law is that "compromising the privacy interests of the
young could hamper their later ability to function with full recognition
246. Id.
247. Id. The exclusionary rule states that when evidence is obtained illegally, it will not be
admitted in a federal prosecution, in order to enforce the Fourth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961). The rule was created by the Court, however, and does not appear in
the text of the Fourth Amendment.
248. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 374 (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976); 36 U.S.C. § 172
(2000) (Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag)). It is interesting to note that students are required to
say the Pledge of Allegiance at school, which includes this phrase, "liberty and justice for all,"
id.; but justice is not really for all; the phrase does not include the very people (students) re-
quired to recite this oath.
249. Id. at 385 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
250. Id. at 386. Justice Stevens was joined in his opinion by Justice Marshall and in part by
Justice Brennan.
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of their rights as adult citizens and alienate them from a system which
should serve them. '254
Since T.L.O., the Court has gone a step further in allowing blanket,
suspicionless searches in Acton 255 and Earls.2 56 Justice O'Connor, in
her dissenting opinion in Acton, stated that this kind of search, which
amounts to a blanket search, or general warrant, was exactly what the
framers wanted to avoid when they wrote the Fourth Amendment.257
Thus, we are teaching our students to disregard the original intent of
the Constitution, or that this intent was not meant for them, and still
does not apply to them today.
Justice Ginsburg, dissenting in Earls, argued that the majority's al-
lowance of such searches was completely out of place. 258 These stu-
dents, whose rights were being subjected to the will of the school
district, were precisely the students that the district should be the least
concerned about in terms of drug use.259 If the school was concerned
about students using drugs, it should have shifted its focus to the stu-
dents who were not involved in extra-curricular activities, because
those students are much more likely to be at risk for drug use.260
Therefore, the impact on students is not really to protect them-as the
Court purports to do. The realistic impact upon students is to deprive
them of their rights and to teach them that their rights are not as im-
portant in this society as the rights of the adults who are making these
decisions for them.
B. More Teens Will Be Executed in This Country
The juvenile justice system was established to rehabilitate criminals
and to prevent crime, not only to exact retribution. Although the
teens who are sentenced to death are tried as adults, they are still
teens, who we, as a country, at one time wanted to help and to rehabil-
itate, not to kill. Several scholars have offered alternative solutions to
imposing the death penalty on young offenders.
In the midst of these solutions is a theory that teens and their par-
ents need to be empowered and need to feel a sense of value and self-
esteem. Schools need to teach these values to children and teens, so
that, as future parents, they can instill such values in their own chil-
254. Id.
255. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
256. Pottawamie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
257. Acton, 515 U.S. at 669 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
258. See Pottawamie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justices




dren.261 Another scholar advocates for youth empowerment as a long
term solution.262 Youth empowerment programs should begin in pre-
school and continue throughout a child's school career.2 63 Programs
such as Head Start, which gain community support through the
school, are a good starting point because they work to create empow-
erment among children at a very young age.264
To continue to allow capital punishment as an appropriate sentence
for teens is to send the message to adolescents that we have no faith in
young offenders, no faith that they can become productive members
of society.2 65 This can only have a snowball effect on other teens who
are on the verge of trouble with the law. Messages from adults are an
important influence in the lives of our young citizens, especially those
who do not have the advantage of healthy parents who are capable of
caring for their children. The Court, by its conclusion that the execu-
tion of juveniles does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment,
has sent a message to adolescents that they will no longer be protected
from the ultimate punishment. 266 So why bother protecting them
from anything else? And why should they bother to protect
themselves?
C. Teen Girls May Not Be Protected or Compensated by Their
School Districts if They Become Victims of Sexual
Harassment at School
Because the Court has held that school districts are not liable under
Title IX for damages to students who are sexually abused by teachers
unless the district actually knew of the abuse, school districts may now
have an incentive to turn their backs to possible abuse or rumors
about a specific teacher. This may potentially have a devastating im-
pact on teen girls because, while schools attempt to limit their civil
liability, abusive teachers may escape criminal sanctions in the pro-
cess; if students are not encouraged to talk about the abuse or harass-
ment, there exists a chance that no one, not even the police, will ever
know what the student has endured.
The actual knowledge standard imposed by the Court implies that
the victim has the obligation to report the abuse in order to recover
261. See Kathleen M. Heide, Why Kids Keep Killing: The Correlates, Causes and Challenge of
Juvenile Homicide, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 43, 47 (1996).
262. See Jackson, supra note 221, at 429-30.
263. Id.
264. See id. at 436.
265. Id.
266. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
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from the school district. Expecting a young girl to report sexual abuse
by an authority figure, like a teacher, is futile and unreasonable.2 67
There are two reasons for this. First, she may be afraid of her teacher,
and if she is a good student, afraid of the effect on her grades and
college admission. Second, a girl in high school may not view this sex-
ual relationship as abuse; she may view it as a romantic affair and not
want to report it. It is abuse, however, and the teacher and school
officials who let it happen must be held liable.
The doctrine of in loco parentis poses some problems here. While a
school has custody of a child during the school day, it is said to be in
loco parentis, in place of the parent. 268 The problem presented is that
if a parent were to sexually abuse his or her child, society would not
allow it, the child would likely be taken from the parent. But when a
school teacher, acting in place of the parent, abuses a child, the Court
has allowed the teacher's employers, the school district, to escape lia-
bility easily. The individual teacher may still be punished, but we
should be protecting our students to the fullest extent possible. Hold-
ing school districts liable also creates an incentive for schools to at-
tempt to prevent such abuse and harassment.
The result in Gebser has prompted some scholars to call for statu-
tory modification of Title IX.269 These modifications would include
the dissent's position in Gebser that standard agency law should apply,
with affirmative defenses available to the defendant and a monetary
267. See Graham, supra note 176, at 587.
268. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *453 (1765). One scholar has also noted:
According to the in loco parentis doctrine, a parent "may ... delegate part of his [or
her] parental authority ... to the tutor or schoolmaster or his [or her] child; who is then
in loco parentis, and has such a portion of the power of the parent committed to his
charge,... that of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer the purposes
for which he is employed .... "
Todd A. DeMitchell, The Duty To Protect: Blackstone's Doctrine of In Loco Parentis: A Lens for
Viewing the Sexual Abuse of Students, 2002 BYU Educ. & L.J. 17, 18-19 (2002). Schools protect
the students while they are at school, as parents would at home. Id. at 19. This reflects the view
of the "legal status of minors in a public school setting." id. This view, however, can present
problems. If the school is supposed to take the place of the parent and protect the child, then
clearly, it is permitted to take some rights away from the students. This is the crux of the tension
explored here. Schools are trying so hard to protect teens from themselves, and yet it does not
seem to be working, while the Court is not protecting teens enough, and yet allowing schools to
take rights away from the teen population for the purpose of protecting it.
269. Daniel P. Colling, Note, Statutory Modification Needed for Title IX in Light of Gebser v.
Lago Vista Independent School District, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 1565 (1999). Coiling argues that
"[t]he Supreme Court's policy choice to faithfully extend vicarious liability under Title VII, but
yet, anomalously foreclose that very idea under Title IX is unjustified." Id. at 1594. Colling's
modification calls for incorporating traditional agency principals, allowing the defendant an af-
firmative defense, and creating a cap on monetary damages under Title IX. See id. at 1594-97.
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cap on damages.270 If this were to happen, the impact on teen girls
might be measurable; but as it stands now, the impact must be unfa-
vorable, even without hard data to verify it. One need only use com-
mon sense to know that schools and school districts will do what they
need to in order to protect themselves from liability and a large judg-
ment for damages, which is understandable. Unfortunately, this result
is only in the best interest of the school districts, and not in the best
interests of the students who are being victimized.
V. CONCLUSION
The treatment of teens by the United States Supreme Court is in-
consistent. If teens need to be held to adult responsibility, then they
should be afforded the same constitutional rights and protection that
adults are afforded. If their rights are to be taken away because we
need to protect our youth, then we should protect them. We should
try to help a troubled sixteen-year-old child who is so disturbed as to
take another's life. We cannot have it both ways, and to try to do so is
not in the best interests of our children and society.
The Court should think of the bigger, broader picture when making
its decisions. While the Justices are not social workers, their decisions
can, and certainly do, affect the lives of adolescents in this country.
The Court has the power to make parents' lives and teens' lives easier,
and to help teens make sense of the world at a time when many things
do not make sense. If the Court makes its decisions with this in mind,
it will go a long way in sending more consistent and appropriate
messages to our teen population. This, in turn, will go a long way in
helping to solve some of the issues that teens face today, including
violence and sexual abuse. We must help adolescents to feel more like
a valuable part of society, and we as a society must believe that they
are valuable because it is these young people who will, in the near
future, be the leaders of our communities.
Suzanne Milne Alexander*
270. Id.; Gebser v. Lago Vista, 524 U.S. 274, 302 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Change,
however, is slow. This is unfortunate, because, even without data, it is plausible to assume that
this kind of abuse is happening every day in our public schools. One need only spend some time
with high school girls to learn this sad truth.
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